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1 INTRODUCTION
Just a few decades ago, the Arabian Gulf was a vast stretch of desert. The economy for many Gulf
cities was based on regional trade, and the hearts of the city were centered around trading ports. The
Gulf as we know it today, featuring futuristic skylines and unparalleled luxury, is a result of extremely
rapid and expansive development plans that were financed through oil wealth. Because Gulf countries
hosted small local population sizes, they looked outward to find the solution for their labor deficit. At
the time, the Gulf already hosted significant migrant populations. As the demand for labor increased,
migration evolved as the most efficient solution for balancing the labor deficit.
With the rapid influx of migrant workers to meet the labor demand, the kafala system emerged as
the mechanism which regulated the migrant labor population. The kafala system, best described as a
sponsorship system, has played a central role in the rapid economic development in the GCC states –
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Though it has allowed the
Gulf States to obtain the resources necessary to develop both economically and cosmetically, the system
has had an array of undesirable byproducts that have significantly altered the texture of Gulf society.
The kafala system promotes the rapid influx of migrants to meet the labor demand while simultaneously
subjugating this imported population through its lax regulations and exclusion from the legal framework
in Gulf States. As a result, the Gulf has witnessed an emergence of multi-tiered societies where locals
are situated in the top tier and migrant populations consistently occupy the lowest rungs of society. The
kafala system has produced structural inequalities in Gulf States, and has resulted in the justification of
human rights abuses against migrant laborers. Today, the effects of the kafala system are visible in
every aspect of Gulf society. The spatial layout of Gulf cities speaks to the social dynamic that the kafala
system fosters. Just as nationals live and exist in the heart of the city, they are central to the benefits of
the kafala system. Migrant labor populations typically live on the periphery of Gulf cities, which mirrors
their marginalized role in society.

2 HISTORY
The history of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, especially in terms of migration flows, is
popularly divided into periods of pre-oil and post-oil. However, the Arabian Gulf hosts a long history of
global connectivity and interaction with its neighboring countries. The oil boom in the 1950s and 60s in
the Arabian Gulfs parked rapid development, which put a demand on labor. 1 Due to small population
sizes in the Gulf, GCC countries relied on imported labor to balance out their local labor deficits, which
has primarily been sourced from the Indian subcontinent and South Asia.2
Long before the discovery of oil and the arrival of the British and Portuguese in the 16th century,
the dominant industry in the Gulf was pearl diving, which fostered a flourishing trade market between
the Arabian Gulf and its Persian and Asian neighbors. Gulf locals took advantage of the rich pearl beds
1

From here on out, the Arabian Gulf will be referred to as the Gulf. This refers to the area of GCC countries before
they were formalized as modern states.
2
The Indian subcontinent refers to the Southern region of Asia that projects into the Indian Ocean, including India,
Pakistan and Bangladesh.
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situated in the Indian Ocean, and their livelihoods were formed around the trade of this amenity. The
Indian and Iranian merchants, who were wealthier than their Gulf neighbors at the time, profited from
trading pearls and returning home with high quality goods to sell (Vora 2013, 54). They also participated
in trading textiles, rice, and other foods and spices (Gardner 2010, 26).
Because the Gulf was not as wealthy or developed as its neighbors India or Persia, powerful
members of South Asian families profited from setting up banks in the region, serving as financiers to
ruling families and oftentimes loaned money to the pearl divers and ship owners. This dynamic allowed
the merchants to profit from interest rates at the expense of the divers who were actually taking part in
the manual labor (Gardner 2010, 26).
The pearl industry and the presence of Indian and Persian merchants established trade ties
between the Gulf and its neighbors on the opposite side of the Indian Ocean long before the arrival of
the Portuguese and the British. When the British arrived in the Gulf and established its protectorate of
several sheikhdoms along the coast in 1820, the pre-established trade ties between the Gulf and its
regional neighbors were formalized. 3 This shift was reflected in the emerging Indian population in Gulf
port cities, and dependence on India and South Asia as trade partners intensified. Further trade activity
was to be limited to British colonial goods, which resulted in a deepened connection between the Gulf
and India (Vora 2013, 54).

2.1 WAVES OF IMMIGRATION TO THE GULF
Because of the long-standing presence of Indians and Persians in the Gulf, flows of migration to
and from the Gulf have continued for much of known history. Andrew Gardner divides these flows into
three overlapping waves. The first wave dates back to the beginning of known history in the Gulf and
ends with the arrival of the British. For much of known history, Indian merchants travelled across the
Indian Ocean to participate in trade of rice, cloth, food and spices (Gardner 2010, 26). These merchants
often returned back to the subcontinent, though some remained and established themselves as bankers
and financiers. This phase set the framework for future trade and migration conduits.
The second wave began with the presence of the British in the Gulf, dating back to 1820. The
establishment of British protectorates, known as Trucial States, formalized the connection to the Indian
subcontinent. Because of the proximity and established British presence in India, Britain’s relations with
the Gulf were largely conducted by British Indian officials. The presence of British administrators in the
Gulf fostered the migration of Indian bureaucrats during this period (Gardner 2010, 27). During this
period the Gulf also began to form the basic infrastructure of a modern government, which included the
establishment of governmental departments and institutions.
The third and final wave is characterized by the booming oil industry in the Gulf. This phase began
in the 1960s and gathered speed in the 1970s. Though oil was discovered in the early part of the 20th
century in the Gulf, the widespread success of the oil industry was not seen until the 1960s and 70s
(Gardner 2010, 27). The new and rapid influx of wealth in these recently independent countries inspired
plans for development and modernization, which necessitated the importation of labor.

3
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During this period, many of the Gulf States gained independence from Britain. The British
government realized that it could not afford to continue its protectorate of the Trucial States. The British
government announced this decision in 1968, and by 1971 the Treaty that established the Trucial States
had ended. Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi and Sheikh Rashid of Dubai met after the announcement in 1968
to discuss a federation of the Trucial States. Bahrain and Qatar denied the invitation to join the
federation and formed their own separate countries. When the protectorate of Trucial States officially
expired on December 1, 1971, Abu Dhabi and Dubai formed a union along with the leaders of five other
sheikhdoms (Gornall 2011). Today, these make up the seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates.
The demographic profile of the typical migrant also shifted during this third wave. Until the late
1980s and 1990s, the majority of migrants came from other Arab countries, such as Yemen, Egypt,
Jordan, Syria and Iraq (Babar 2014). This time period saw a sharp decrease in the numbers of Arab
migrants and a substantial increase in Asian migrants, a shift that is often referred to as the
“Asianization” of migrant labor (Kamrava and Babar 2012).
Gulf countries were initially very tolerant of Arab migrants due to their cultural and linguistic
homogeneity. Though the cultural similarities between locals and Arab migrant populations once
appealed to Gulf governments, the booming oil industry forced leaders to reevaluate the presence of
other Arabs in the Gulf. At the time, Pan-Arabism ideologies successfully blanketed the rest of the
Middle East and North Africa. The Pan-Arabism ideology viewed Arab countries as a single nation and
supported the unification of all countries in the greater Arab world. This integration of the Gulf with the
rest of the Arab world would entail the redistribution of oil wealth among the Arab community. These
thoughts and ideas were viewed as progressive and revolutionary, and leaders in the Gulf began to view
this movement as a threat to the stable, authoritarian monarchies (Babar 2014).
The booming oil industry allowed Gulf States to develop extensive welfare programs which
provided generous benefits for its citizens. With the rise of the welfare state, Gulf countries became
more limited in their scope of tolerance for migrants. While Gulf countries once offered naturalization
programs for other Arab migrants, these programs were phased out by the 1970s (Babar 2014). Other
nationality and citizenship laws were instituted, making welfare benefits exclusive to Gulf nationals. Gulf
leaders began to view Asian migrants as less of a threat than Arabs, and their position as laborers in the
region became preferred for many reasons. Kamrava and Babar explain that Asians are less of an
ideological threat than their Arab neighbors, Asians tolerate lower wages, they are easier to lay off,
easier to segregate, and they tend to migrate without their families (Kamrava and Babar 2012, 8). By the
end of the 20th century, South Asians became the face of migrants in GCC countries.
While the narrative of migration in GCC countries oftentimes perceives oil as the determinant for
migration flows, the longstanding history of the Indian and Persian presence in the Gulf demonstrates
otherwise. However, the oil industry did serve as a catalyst for inflows of immigrants, particularly those
working in the construction and labor industries.
Before the discovery of oil, Gulf cities were centered around regional trading ports and mercantile
centers. The rapid success that oil brought to the region allowed countries such as the United Arab
Emirates to devote oil revenues to development and modernization plans, which aimed to construct a
global and cosmopolitan landscape. Somewhere between the mercantile history and the new
cosmopolitan prototype of Gulf countries, Asian migrants became socially and physically marginalized
on the periphery of the successes of these new, iconic cities. In the case study of Dubai, I will discuss the
5

shift from the city-center in the Dubai Creek area of Dubai’s mercantile days to the “New Dubai” in the
post-oil landscape and how this move left migrant workers behind.

3 TRENDS AND STATISTICS
All six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates - are characterized by a demographic imbalance between migrants
and nationals. All six countries are included in the top 20 nations in the world with the highest
proportion of migrants to nationals (Kamrava and Babar 2012, 8). The United Arab Emirates is a
quintessential example of this rapid increase in the sheer number of migrant workers in a short period
of time (See Figure 1). From 2007 to 2008, there was a jump from 3.11 million migrant workers to 4.07,
a 30% increase over the time period of one year (Janardhan 2011, 97). In Qatar, the economically active
population doubled three times from 2004 to 2011 (State of Qatar 2011). By 2011, non-Qataris reached
93.9% of the total population
(State of Qatar 2011).

UAE Population by Nationality (National - Non
This dynamic places a
National)
myriad of pressures on local
populations, local
8,000,000
governments and on the
7,000,000
6,000,000
migrants themselves. Not
5,000,000
only has this increase in
4,000,000
immigration had a drastic
3,000,000
effect on the population
2,000,000
demographics, but also on
1,000,000
the workforce. It is
0
estimated that by 2020,
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Emirati nationals will
National
Non-National
account for less than 4% of
Figure 1 Source: UAE National Bureau of Statistics; Graph generated by author
the total workforce in their
own country (Janardhan
2011, 98). The Gulf countries have historically had small native-born populations, so extensive
development and modernization plans in GCC countries required an influx of labor to put the blueprints
of these elaborate projects to life. The construction industry is one of the most essential to these
projects, so I will focus on this particular industry throughout this paper.
This rapid growth of the migrant population has marginalized nationals in terms of jobs and
employment in the private sector. Because Asian immigrants are willing to work for lower wages and are
easier to manage, construction companies and service sector employers prefer non-nationals. Another
byproduct of oil revenue is the welfare state, which allows governments to provide extensive benefits to
its citizens. As part of these benefits, the government reserves public sector jobs for citizen workers. For
example, non-nationals make up almost 85% of the total population in the United Arab Emirates
(Central Intelligence Agency 2013). Of the employed non-nationals in the country, 64.6% are working for
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the private sector compared with 7.4% of employed nationals (United Arab Emirates Government 2009,
Table 18).4
This dynamic is very apparent in Gulf cities. The segregation of nationalities between sectors of
the economy was visible within the first few hours I spend in the UAE. The Dubai International Airport,
owned by the Dubai government, is fully staffed by Emirati nationals, which is indicated by the
traditional Emirati garb. However once you leave the airport and get in a cab or enter a mall, it appears
that low-wage service sector is dominated by South Asian migrant populations. When dealing with the
Immigration Office or other divisions of the government, it was apparent that all employees were
Emirati nationals.

3.1 REMITTANCES
As hosts to a large number of foreign workers, GCC countries have become significant
contributors to global net remittance totals. According to a calculation by N. Janardhan, remittances
from GCC countries total $35 billion each year (Janardhan 2011, 121). The top remittance recipient in
2010 was India, who received $55 billion (World Bank 2011). The Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and
Egypt were also in the top 10 recipients (World Bank 2011). Not surprisingly, these are the countries
that constitute a majority of the migrant population in Gulf countries.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman were in the top 10 remittance-sending countries in 2009 (World
Bank 2011). The United Arab Emirates and Qatar do not have any data on remittances. The charts in
Figure 2 illustrate the sheer quantities of money that GCC countries are contributing to the global
economy through remittances.
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Figure 2 -- Source: World Bank; charts generated by author
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The next largest sector of non-national employment is housework (i.e. maids).
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3.2 EMIGRATION
Of the 232 million migrants in the world in 2013, more than half were concentrated in just 10
countries. Of these ten countries, the United Arab Emirates hosted 8 million and Saudi Arabia hosted 9
million (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2013). India consistently tops the list of the
immigration source countries in the GCC, and South Asians make up the majority of the population in
the United Arab Emirates (Janardhan 2011, 96). In 2013, 2.9 million Indians were residing in the UAE.
India to the UAE was the second most populated corridor of migration in 2013.5
These numbers do not indicate motivations for migration, whether political or economic (or both),
however they are telling of the broad trends that the Gulf has witnessed. Though South Asian labor
migrants dominate the migrant population in Gulf countries, the migrant population is still very diverse.
For instance, while their numbers do not constitute a significant amount of the total population, there
are many East African and European expatriates living in the Gulf (Central Intelligence Agency 2013).6

4 TREATMENT OF WORKERS
The rapid influx of migrant workers to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries has provided the
necessary manpower for the light speed execution of development plans in the Gulf. From the tallest
building in the world, the artificial palm islands, to the fastest roller coaster in the world in Abu Dhabi’s
Ferrari World, the United Arab Emirates has consistently topped lists and broken records in the last few
decades. The brand that the city of Dubai has become offers unparalleled luxury with the only seven star
5

The first was Bangladesh to India; the 9th was India to Saudi Arabia. (DESA International Migration 2013: Migrants
by Origin and Destination).
6
Most of the population statistics produced by the government are broken down by national/non-national
categories, so it is difficult to find information on the population broken down by specific nationalities. However,
the East African diaspora is visible in Gulf society. For example, I had encounters with many Kenyans and Ugandans
who were employed in the service sector. Further, there was a significant West African population in the student
body at the American University.
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hotel in the world (Burj al Arab), and bountiful glitz and glamor with endless nightclubs and five star
restaurants. Like all good things, this luxury and extravagance comes with a price. The hands that
physically built the iconic infrastructure of the Gulf have become invisible. Their hard labor tends to fall
in the shadows of the buildings which they build, and their narratives not only fall on deaf ears, but they
are oftentimes never articulated in the first place.
After spending time in the Gulf, it is noticeably clear how these countries were built. You cannot
leave your house without noticing the toil of the South Asian migrant population. They often line the
streets, perfecting the artificial landscapes that don’t belong in the desert in the first place. They erect
the buildings in which nationals and Western expats live and work, and they plant the palm trees that
surround them. The lives of migrant workers can largely be characterized by a dedication to providing
the luxury and extravagance which nationals and Western expatriates enjoy.
With the shift of Gulf cities to new, more cosmopolitan areas in the early part of the 21st century,
the demographic imbalance became polarized at the expense migrant workers. As the wealthy
urbanized and moved to newer areas of the city, populations that could not keep up remained on the
periphery of the city. This divide was not only physical, but as Gulf cities became more developed and
modern, boundaries between nationals and non-nationals became more defined both socially and
institutionally.7
This shift essentially deteriorated the quality of life for migrant workers, who built these new cities
with their own hands and were then forced to live on their peripheries. Hiring foreign workers in low
status sectors of the economy allows countries to fill the low rungs of society with foreigners without
creating sharp class divides within their own local population (Weiner 1990, 3). Because the GCC
countries were newly independent, there were often few mechanisms to ensure protection for laborers.
Migrant workers are mistreated throughout every stage of the immigration process, by the recruiting
agencies in their home countries, the GCC governments themselves, and by their employers. The reality
of the lives of migrant laborers is not simply characterized by harsh working conditions, but injustices
that deny this portion of the population basic human rights. The rest of this section is dedicated to
discussing these injustices and discriminations and how they create a cycle of debt and misery for the
South Asian demographic in the GCC.

4.1 RECRUITMENT
The beginning stages of the migration process are in the sending country. Agencies recruit
workers in the home country and arrange a contract between the worker and the employer in the
destination country. This is perceived as an invaluable service to the migrant, who oftentimes has a
vision of foreseeable success for their new lives in the destination country. This idealized vision allows
recruitment agents to charge inflated prices for their services, averaging between 2,000 and 3,000 US
Dollars (Human Rights Watch 2006, 8).
The recruiters arrange employment contracts, apply for worker visas in the destination country,
and purchase air travel. If a migrant is not able to pay the recruitment fees him or herself or with the
7
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help of friends and family, he or she can take a loan attached with staggering interest rates from the
recruitment agency (Human Rights Watch 2006, 8).
The combination of recruitment fees and interest rates tacked onto the loans to pay the fees puts
migrants in a disadvantaged state of debt before they even arrive to their destination country. To add to
the financial stress, agents and brokers in sending countries often have meager information about the
contracts which they arrange (Gardner 2012, 57). Employers often switch the terms of contract upon
arrival to the destination country, which include much lower wages and poorer living conditions than
they were promised by the agent in their home country (Human Rights Watch 2006, 34). This
transaction of misinformation perpetuates what Gardner calls the “migration industry,” where agents
and employers “profit from the migration flows, using poor information to extract profit from the flow
of unskilled migrants to the region,” (Gardner 2012, 57). The recruiters create and exploit this idealized
vision of life in the Gulf to make a profit.
Once the migrant arrives in the destination country and begins work, the shock of reality of life in
the Gulf as a migrant worker begins to set in. It usually takes about two years for workers to pay back
debts to their recruitment agencies and to their friends and family (Human Rights Watch 2006, 8). At
this point, romanticized visions of life in the Gulf that were formed in the sending countries have likely
been contradicted by the reality of lived experiences. The migrants themselves also contribute to this
transaction of misinformation. When they realize that their initial views of life in the Gulf were rooted in
fantasy, feelings of embarrassment set in. The migrants and their families made great sacrifices to send
them to the Gulf, so the migrants do not want their families to be disappointed or worried that their
living conditions in their new homes are abysmal. The combination of pride and desire to prevent their
families from feeling worried results in migrants depicting idealized images of their lives in the Gulf that
contradict reality. Andrew Gardner noted that many of the migrants he interviewed sent pictures of
themselves sitting behind a desk back to their families, which further perpetuates the issue of
misinformation in sending countries about life in the Gulf (Gardner 2012, 58).

4.2 PASSPORT CONFISCATION AND TRAVEL BANS
One of the most common and consistent injustices cited by migrant workers is the confiscation of
passports upon arrival in the destination country. Though the practice is illegal in most GCC countries,
passports are widely and systematically confiscated by companies and employers. Of the 60
construction workers interviewed in the UAE for Human Rights Watch’s “Building towers, Cheating
Workers,” none reported that they were allowed to maintain possession of their own passports (Human
Rights Watch 2006, 10).
The practice of confiscating passports effectively places a travel ban on migrant workers. This
procedure is justified by companies so that workers do not abscond and break their contracts.
Confiscating passports exacerbates a non-negotiable power dynamic between the employee and the
employer, with the employer holding all of the power. This dynamic allows companies to treat workers
unjustly and makes it nearly impossible for workers to break free of their harsh living and working
conditions.
Passports are also often held as collateral to prevent workers making any legal claims against their
sponsor or employer (Gardner 2010, 62-3). This provides yet another conduit for companies to profit
from the injustice done to migrant workers. If a worker wishes to break away from his contract, the only
10

way of doing so is to buy back his passport from his employer and return home. Because the worker is
already in debt as a result of the recruitment fees, paying more money to leave without paying off
preexisting debt is unlikely. The workers are therefore beholden to their sponsor.

4.3 WAGES
Another aspect of life as a migrant worker in the Gulf that contradicts romanticized views
fashioned in the home country is the insufficient wages that the workers receive as compensation for
their intensive labor. On average, a construction worker in the United Arab Emirates makes $175 per
month, a sum that falls short of a living wage (Human Rights Watch 2006, 23).
Not only are the wages consistently low for the service sector in GCC countries, but there is also a
wage disparity based on nationality and ethnicity. Inconsistent value is placed on the work done by
certain nationalities, with South and East Asians on the bottom rung of the ladder. The work of Arab
migrants and Western expatriates is valued much higher than Asian migrants, but still Emirati nationals
are placed at the top of the ladder, earning much higher wages for less demanding work.
This phenomenon is supported by numbers found in the Labor Force Survey conducted by the
Dubai government. The mean income per month for an Emirati national is 20,557.50 AED (5,597.69 USD),
with the median at 18,000 AED (4,901.29 USD). For non-nationals, the mean income for month is
5,813.08 AED (1,582.87 USD), and a median of 2,500 AED (680.74 USD) (United Arab Emirates
Government 2009, Table 36).8
An examination of wages in the public and private sector offers another piece of supporting
evidence of the wage disparity in GCC countries. In a closer look at the wages of all residents (including
nationals and non-nationals) in the United Arab Emirates that breaks down economic activity by sector,
it is found that almost one-third of construction workers make less than 1,300 AED ($353.98) per month.
23.8% make between 1,300 and 2,999 AED per month ($353.98 - $816.61), and 24.5% make between
3,000 and 7,999 AED per month ($816.88 - $2,178.08) (United Arab Emirates Government 2009, Table
33). A vast majority of the construction sector does not even earn half the median earned by nationals.
On the other hand, the majority of public administration officials make over 18,000 AED
($4,901.29) per month. 25.4% make between 8,000 and 17,999 AED per month ($2,178.35 - $4,901)
(United Arab Emirates Government 2009, Table 33).9 Also in the public sector, almost half of legislators,
senior officials and managers in the United Arab Emirates make above 18,000 AED per month
($4,901.29). 37% make between 8,000 and 17,999 ($2,178.35 – $4,901) (United Arab Emirates
Government 2009, Table 32). This same ethno-national hierarchical structure that exists in the Emirates
is present across Gulf countries. In a study on labor in Kuwait in 2009, Dinkha and Dakhli found that
Kuwaiti nationals earn higher pay for the same jobs (Dinkha and Dakhli 2009, 52).
The wage discrepancies between migrant workers, nationals and Western expats create a social
hierarchy that places migrant laborers in the lowest bracket of society. The legal structure in place, of
which the kafala system is a part, creates a system of favoritism, which benefits nationals in all areas of
8

Note that the numbers for non-nationals also include Western expatriates who likely skew the data upward.
Western expats are in a position to own and operate companies, where Asian migrant workers have less social and
professional mobility.
9
I looked at Public administration because the majority of nationals are employed by the public sector.

11

life, including business ownership, education, work, welfare benefits and various other rights (Dinkha
and Dakhli 2009, 51). The random valuation of labor based on nationality creates what Dinkha and
Dakhli call a “multi-tier labor market,” which applies different laws, wages, and benefits to each socially
insulated tier (Dinkha and Dakhli 2009, 48).
The tension between the lowest rungs of society and nationals is ever-present in the Gulf, and
treating migrant workers like they don’t exist is a socially engrained practice that is taught at an early
age. It is so deep-seated that even tourists catch on to the systematic erasure of the labor force of the
Gulf. Upon arrival to the United Arab Emirates, one of the first things that I was told was never to make
eye contact with a laborer on the street. Inter-class dialogue is seen as socially unacceptable, and this
dynamic of separation end exclusion has instilled a culture of racism and classism in the Gulf. Disparities
among the expatriate population are also present. For instance, Western expatriates do not receive the
benefits of citizenship, but they have more social mobility and access to white-collar industries. On the
other hand, it is extremely rare to find expatriates of Asian or African descent working a white-collar job.
This portion of the migrant population dominates the service sector of the economy.
4.3.1

Withheld Wages
In addition to inadequate wages, another one of the most common complaints among migrant
workers is withheld wages (Human Rights Watch 2006, 29). The monetary compensation for the
strenuous labor is already initially inadequate, but companies and employers systematically withhold
wages from workers for months at a time. According to labor laws in the UAE, withholding wages from
workers is deemed illegal. 10 However, like many other regulations in the country, this law is commonly
ignored.
Withheld wages has been the leading cause of strikes in the UAE and across the Gulf (Human
Rights Watch 2006, 30).11 Though unionizing and striking is deemed illegal throughout the country and
punished by deportation, the consequences associated with withheld wages are grave enough to drive
workers to risk deportation. When wages are withheld, workers are forced to borrow money with
interest just to obtain the resources needed to survive. Withholding wages is comparable to
confiscating passports as a mechanism utilized by countries to prevent workers from absconding. A
worker is less likely to quit and return home if that means sacrificing months of pay, especially if they
are already in debt to the recruitment agencies back at home.

4.4 LABOR CAMPS
One of the most shocking and heartbreaking aspects of the reality of the lives of migrant workers
in the Gulf are their living conditions. Workers are piled into labor camps on the periphery of the city,
which are segregated from the city center both geographically and socially. Their distance from the city
and from the eyes of nationals allows the companies and government to overlook the unsanitary and
ghastly living conditions of migrant workers.
In Dubai’s two largest camps, Al Quoz and Sonapor, the typical dwelling is a small room of 12 by 9
feet which sleeps as many as 8 workers (Human Rights Watch 2009, 23). Other accounts of labor camps
cite as many as 12 workers sharing one room (Ali 2010, 91). Not only are these camps overcrowded, but
10
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This is likely true across the GCC, but I have not examined each country’s laws regarding labor.
Strikes in the UAE due to withheld wages will be discussed in the case study of Dubai.
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they lack sanitary living conditions. In Sayed Ali’s account of Sonapur, he disclosed that many of the
compounds have poor drainage and sanitation. Septic tanks have overflown, leaving pools of stagnant
sewage throughout the compound. This is to no fault of the workers, but rather the camp owners who
consciously choose not to operate the camp in a proper manner (Ali 2010, 91). In another camp that
Human Rights Watch visited, electricity was cut off because the company chose not to pay the bills
(Human Rights Watch 2006, 34).
In April 2009, BBC’s Panorama program exposed that the UAE’s largest construction firm, Arabtec,
housed their employees in filthy and overcrowded camps. Raw sewage laid in stagnant pools throughout
the camp, requiring workers to tip toe on stepping stones just to navigate in their living space. Many of
the toilets lacked water, resulting in massive piles of raw feces (Allen 2009). This exposé was one of the
first of its kind, revealing the inhumane living conditions in which migrant workers are housed.
GCC governments lack the mechanisms to prevent these sorts of injustices done unto migrant
workers. In the case of the Arabtec situation, the government fined the company 10,000 AED ($2,723) in
the aftermath of BBC’s expose. However, this is a small sum for such a large company. This suggests that
the governments do not see any responsibility for the behavior of corporations working in their territory,
and a later section will demonstrate how governments use free trade zones to allow foreign companies
to operate outside of the legal framework.
The government also tacitly promotes this marginalization of migrant workers through legal codes.
Even if companies or employers desired to house their employees in the heart of the city with
acceptable living conditions, the government makes it difficult to do so. In 2006, the Dubai government
cracked down on bachelors living in villas in family designated neighborhoods (Ali 2010, 93). Because
single men are legally forbidden from family residential areas, migrant workers particularly in the
construction sector, which is dominated by males, are systematically excluded from these
neighborhoods. Coincidentally, these are the neighborhoods that occupy the center of the city. When a
construction firm in Dubai headed by a European family decided to house its employees in villas in the
Jumeirah area, officials from the municipality evicted the workers and encouraged them to find housing
in a labor camp (Ali 2010, 93).12
It is important to note that the frequency of laborers forced to live in camps is high. A survey
conducted by the Qatar government in 2008 showed that of all the housing in Qatar, ¼ of the housing
units were dedicated to worker housing compounds, and about 60% of the population of Qatar lived in
these compounds. Of those that live in worker compounds, ¾ of these residents are male expatriates
(Permanent Population Committee of the State of Qatar 2009).
As GCC countries modernized, developed, and globalized, the center of the city shifted from older
port areas to new, globalized city centers. This shift simultaneously raised the cost of living in both areas.
From 2005 to 2006 in Dubai, rents drastically increased in price. In some areas, rent increased over 100
percent and continued to increase into 2008 (Ali 2010, 93). As GCC countries and cities globalized,
migrant workers were left behind and were unable to keep up with new lavish lifestyles that global GCC
cities promoted. The shift from regional mercantile trading centers to global oil producers effectively
marginalized the labor force of Gulf countries.
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reputation as one of the nicest areas of Dubai, it is one of the most expensive places to live in the city.
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The location of labor camps on the outskirts of Gulf cities allows nationals and other Western
expatriates to remain ignorant to the lives of migrant workers. The map below of the major labor camps
in Dubai provides a telling illustration of their sidelined position in the city. This contributes to the
inherent classism of Gulf societies, and instills a state of silence in Gulf residents when it comes to the
lives and living conditions of migrant workers.

4.5 BAN ON LABOR UNIONS, STRIKES, AND ORGANIZATION
Another mechanism that GCC governments utilize to subordinate migrant workers is through
prohibiting laborers from joining labor unions, organizing, and striking. The voices of migrant workers
are practically nonexistent in legal narratives. As Human Rights Watch points out, there are no
organizations independent of the government to advocate for migrant workers’ rights. There is also no
mechanism to systematically report abuses of workers (Human Rights Watch 2006, 24).
Though the kafala system forbids strikes among laborers, they have been quite common among
construction workers across the Gulf. From May to December of 2005, over 800 workers united in one
of the UAE’s biggest protests. Workers effectively blocked Dubai’s main thoroughfare to protest the
systematic practice of withholding wages. The strikers cited four consecutive months of withheld wages
by Al Hamed Development and Construction Country. The Minister of Labor quickly demanded that the
company pay the delayed wages, and his timely response was promulgated as a sign that the
government is dedicated to holding companies accountable for the treatment of their workers (Human
Rights Watch 2006, 31). However, the government fell short of actually ensuring that the company paid
14

the workers their wages in the aftermath of the scandal. One Pakistani employee of the company told
HRW that Al Hamed only paid two of the four months of withheld wages. Further, the leaders of the
strike were dismissed from the company and deported back to their home countries (Human Rights
Watch 2006, 31).
During the construction of the Burj Khalifa, the tallest building in the world, the tension between
workers and their companies was extreme.13 Because of the global nature of the construction of the Burj
Khalifa and its symbolic precedence throughout the world, the construction process was watched with
much more scrutiny than ever before. By March of 2006, the tensions were so high between the
workers and their employers that 2,500 migrants banded together to protest their working conditions.
They were unsatisfied with their low wages, living conditions, and delayed payments (Janardhan 2011,
109). The protests turned violent, and the government responded with a new rule that any expatriates
who provoked riots would be deported and unable to return to work for a year (Janardhan 2011, 109).
The kafala system’s ban on labor unions and strikes among migrant labors allows Gulf
governments to treat the workers as temporary guests who are privileged to be working in the Gulf. This
sets a tone for the workers that they must watch their every move, and even something as simple as
demanding the pay that they are owed can earn them a ticket back to their home country.

4.6 HEALTH
Not only do the unsanitary living conditions discussed above pose health problems for migrant
workers, but workers in many sectors are also subjected to hazardous working conditions each day. The
construction industry is a perfect example of the hazardous working conditions that workers face.
The construction industry experiences high injury and death rates in the Gulf. In the Emirates,
labor laws require employers to protect against the hazards of injuries and disease, provide emergency
health care for their workers, pay for the medical treatment of injured workers, and to report injuries to
the Ministry of Labor (Human Rights Watch 2006, 48). This same law regulates the maximum number of
working hours, requires annual leave and overtime, and delineates terms of recruitment. The law also
requires the government to set a minimum wage, however this portion of the law was never executed.
While administrators in the Ministry of Labor in the UAE are to supposed ensure that employers
are in compliance with safety and health regulations, companies can generally evade complying with
these regulations since the Ministry has been largely ineffective in their oversight. The Ministry only
employs 140 inspectors to oversee 240,000 businesses and companies (Human Rights Watch 2006, 44).
This is a glaring disproportionality, which indicates that the government is not truly dedicated to
ensuring the health and safety of migrant workers, who are usually employed by the private companies
which the Ministry of Labor is supposed to oversee.
Numbers and statistics prove just how hazardous the working conditions in the Gulf are for
construction workers. In the UAE, there are more than 700 deaths and 90 suicides each year (Ali 2010,
83). Though there are no official government figures on work related injuries due to a lack of systematic
reporting by companies, a number can still be synthesized through independent investigation and local
trade publications. Construction Week, an online publication for construction news in the Middle East,
13
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reported that in 2004 alone, 880 migrant construction workers died, 460 of which were Indian, 375
Pakistani, and 45 Bangladeshi (Human Rights watch 2006, 11). Another means of determining the
number of work related deaths is through consulates. The Indian Consulate in Dubai reported 971
deaths in 2005, 61 of which were on-site accidents (Human Rights Watch 2006, 11).
Extremely long work days, few days off, and the heat are a few of the conditions which contribute
to hazardous work environments.
4.6.1

Hours and Rest Days
Construction workers in GCC states and other laborers in the service sector are forced to work
long days, lasting up to 12 hours each day, with only one day of rest each week. The Dubai Labor Force
survey shows the disparity of working hours between nationals and migrant workers. In every sector
surveyed, non-nationals worked more total hours per week than nationals (United Arab Emirates
Government 2009, Table 28). 4.1% of nationals worked more than 60 hours each week, while 30.4% of
non-nationals worked more than 60 hours each week (UAE Government 2009, Table 23). In the
construction sector alone, 22.1% work more than 60 hours a week, while only 4% of those working in
public administration and defense and 10.5% of federal and local government employees average over
60 hours each week (UAE Government 2009, Table 25 and 26). When looking at average hours per week,
non-national construction workers average 51.8 hours while nationals in the public administration
average 40 hours a week (UAE Government 2009, Table 29).
Not only are the working hours much higher for non-nationals, especially in the construction
sector, but the Labor Force Survey also indicated that employees of the sectors that average more hours
make less money. In a distribution of paid employees who worked more than 48 hours per week by
level of monthly wages, 64.7% of service workers make less than 1,300 AED each month ($354). On the
other hand, 41% of legislators and senior officials who work more than 48 hours a week make between
8,000 and 17,999 AED per month ($2,178 - $4,901) (UAE Government 2009, Table 41).
4.6.2

Heat
The Gulf can be an excellent travel destination due to its year-round heat and plentiful beaches.
However the heat positions the Gulf as a dangerous destination for workers who are laboring outdoors
for lengthy periods of time each day. During the summer months, the Gulf countries reach up to 50
degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit).
According to the Dubai Chapter of the World Safety Organization, heat-related illness is the
most important issue facing construction workers (Human Rights Watch 2006, 41). Extreme heat can
cause strokes and dehydration among other health concerns. Rashid Hospital in Dubai reported that as
many as 5,000 construction workers were brought into the emergency room for heat-related incidents
during July and August of 2004 (Human Rights Watch 2006, 41).
In 2005, the UAE government instituted a ban on outdoor construction during the hottest hours of
the day to address the health concern that the heat poses (Ali 2010, 83). However, because there are
few inspectors to ensure that companies and employers are in compliance with heath regulations, the
companies rarely abide by this regulation. Regardless, requiring or allowing workers to work during the
peak heat hours is punishable by a fine that equates to pocket change for large companies.
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5 LEGALITY
The GCC has created a unique paradox of crafting ultramodern, luxurious cities for locals and
Westerners to enjoy while denying these same luxuries to the migrant population that makes it all
possible. GCC governments have created a legal system that systematically denies rights to migrant
workers while promoting extensive and lucrative benefits for nationals. On the surface, this allows Gulf
countries to appear as modern, cosmopolitan, and developed. However, you don’t need to spend much
time in the Gulf to find that the treatment of migrant workers starkly contrasts with the modern and
stately infrastructure. This section aims to explain how GCC countries legally perpetuate the denial of
rights and harsh abuses of migrant laborers.

5.1 KAFALA SYSTEM
GCC countries employ a system known as kafala that allows the government to monitor migrant
laborers through national sponsors. The system ties each laborer to a kafeel (sponsor) in the destination
country, who is responsible for arranging his or her visa and employment contract. The kafeel, or
sponsor, is usually also the migrant’s employer. The system requires all labor migrants to operate
through contracts, which usually last for two to three years at a time. Through locating the responsibility
of migrants at the level of the sponsor, the state evades any sort of legal accountability for the migrant
labor population. This controversial system allows Gulf governments to avoid recognizing migrant
workers as residents, meaning that they are not obliged to uphold their rights or to administer benefits
in the way that they do for nationals. This system situates migrant workers as temporary, or “guest”
workers of Gulf countries, which creates an environment of temporality and impermanence for the
laborers. The kafala system dictates the lives of many workers in Gulf countries. In the United Arab
Emirates, about 90% of the population is on a temporary visa (Ali 2010).
Gulf governments choose to uphold the kafala system because it is an easy method of ignoring
and profiting from the human rights abuses of migrant workers. By using the language of “guest” or
“temporary” workers, GCC governments have created a legal system that excludes migrant workers
from society (Vora 2013). The kafala system is an outgrowth of a cultural practice that was used to
organize labor on pearling dhow boats, so the system is viewed as a cultural legacy in the Gulf. The
system emerged as it is practiced today in the 20th century, but is only partially coded in the law
(Gardner 2010, 59).
The kafala system requires migrant laborers to have a sponsor in the destination country, which
effectively ties the migrant to the sponsor for the duration of his or her stay. This structure makes it
hard for workers to abscond from their contracts, which usually last for about two to three years. The
system also requires nationals to comprise a majority of ownership for all companies in the country (Ali
2010, 27).14 Because at least 51 percent of the company must be owned by nationals, large numbers of
nationals are profiting as business partners in exchange for carrying little weight. For instance, if a
business startup plan was only lacking a national owner, the creators of the business will find a national
to sign the paper saying he or she owns a portion of the business. The national does not have to put up
any capital of his or her own but still profits from the business venture (Ali 2010, 27).
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This system produces a wide range of negative consequences for migrant workers while
simultaneously benefiting the sponsors, companies, and GCC countries. Governments prefer to exclude
the migrant labor population from the legal framework of the country because when their voices are not
engaged in legal affairs, they pose less of a threat to the political and economic structures present in the
country (Ali 2010, 27). When migrants have no voice in the legal system, their grievances are not taken
into account in policy, laws, and other government operations.
Governments also benefit because labor management is left to the companies instead of to the
state (Kamrava and Babar 2012, 11). This limits the role of the government in protecting workers’ rights,
and allows the state to point fingers to the hiring companies when they find themselves under a
microscope for allowing human rights abuses. The migrant is connected to his or her kafeel, not to the
state, allowing the state to articulate itself as a minimal player as the guarantor of rights.

5.2 OVERSIGHT DEFICIENCY
Through allowing GCC governments to control migrant populations through sponsor proxies, the
kafala system provides a mechanism for states to exclude migrant laborers from many different spheres
of society. In addition to locating the responsibility of migrant laborers at the level of the employer
instead of in the state, the government systematically ignores its own laws aiming to protect migrant
workers through a lack of oversight. Though there are in fact laws in place to protect migrants from
labor abuses, Gulf governments oftentimes fail to provide the necessary mechanisms for enforcing these
laws.
In the case of the United Arab Emirates, laws are in place to protect workers from abuse
beginning with the recruitment process in their home countries. There are laws banning recruitment
agencies and local employers from charging the migrants any fees associated with the recruitment
process (Human Rights Watch 2006, 11). Employers or sponsors in the UAE are required to pay a fee for
each worker they recruit into the country, which is used to pay for things such as the employment visa.
Though the employer is legally required to cover this cost, these fees are usually levied onto the migrant
during the recruitment process (Human Rights Watch 2006, 26). UAE Labor Law no. 8 of 1980, which
applies to both nationals and migrants, regulates maximum working hours, provides for annual leave an
overtime, regulates terms of recruitment, and requires employers to protect against the hazards of
work-related injury and disease (Human Rights Watch 2006, 48). Employers are required to report workrelated injuries to the Ministry of Labor, and they are also required to pay for the medical treatment for
injured workers (Human Rights Watch 2006, 49).
Though there are established penalties for violations of the law, deficiency in governmental
oversight has allowed companies to abuse migrant laborers against the will of the law. The Ministry of
Labor only employs 140 inspectors to oversee the practice of over 240,000 businesses and companies,
which serves as a tacit promotion of the violation of these labor laws at the expense of the migrants
(Human Rights Watch 2006, 44).
Even if there was an effective mechanism in place to ensure the compliance of the labor laws, the
penalties are almost laughable. The penalty for a violation of any part of UAE’s Labor Law No. 8 includes
imprisonment not to exceed 6 months, and a fine between 3,000 AED and 10,000 AED ($833-2,778)
(Human Rights Watch 2006, 27). These fees are a small chunk of change compared to the exorbitant
profit earned by large companies in Gulf countries.
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GCC governments have done little to prevent the abuse of migrant workers. If anything, their
efforts can be considered reactionary. Governments prefer what David Mendicoff calls “ad hoc
accommodations” that promote informal regulation of abuses (Mendicoff 2012, 194). Using ad hoc
measures allows GCC states to uphold their neoliberal policies, which promote a free market, while
avoiding the obligation to implement regulatory mechanisms. This perpetuates the status of the migrant
population as “temporary” instead of an integral part of their communities. Regulatory, legal
enforcement would undermine the dynamic of temporality that the kafala system instills (Mendicoff
2012, 2014).

5.3 INTERNATIONAL LAW
Though the role of international law holds less authority than domestic law, it is still important to
address the potential role that international law may serve in standardizing the treatment of migrant
workers across the board. While international legal norms have no authority to prevent abuses on the
domestic level, they are an important means of urging countries to adopt and uphold policies to protect
the rights of migrants.
A number of international conventions and declarations set forth the rights of all human beings,
regardless of state ratification. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights define the
rights of all persons to be the right to life, liberty and security; the right not to be held in slavery or
servitude; not to be subjected to torture, cruelty, or inhumane treatment; the right not to be subjected
to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; the freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each state; and the right to work, free choice of employment and just working conditions (Martin 2012,
218-9).
The United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families reestablishes these basic human rights previously set forth, but now in a context specific to
migrant workers (Martin 2012, 219). The Convention aims to protect workers from torture, inhuman
treatment and punishment, forced or compulsory labor, attacks on honor or reputation, unhealthy
working conditions, unequal treatment between migrants and nationals, among others (Martin 2012,
220). The GCC states are clearly in violation of many components of this Convention. However, the
Convention is only ratified by a little more than 40 states, which doesn’t include any of the six GCC
countries.
Though it appears that governments are willing to talk about international migration, it is
apparent that there are no genuine efforts to improve migration policy. Susan Martin suggests that the
most effective way of altering migration policy on the international level would be through coordination
between destination and sending countries (Martin 2012, 221). If the effort becomes bilateral, workers’
rights have the greatest chance of protection.
Further, GCC states should work towards ratifying international declarations and conventions that
provide a standard for the treatment of immigrants and migrant laborers. These are pre-packaged
policies that have great potential to benefit GCC states if adopted and implemented.
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5.4 ASIAN EMIGRATION POLICIES
Another mechanism that perpetuates the flow of Asian migrants to Gulf countries is Asian
emigration policies. If any actor was to advocate for the protection of the rights of migrant workers in
the Gulf, it would seem that it should be the sending countries. However, because the majority of
immigrant-sending countries are dependent on remittance flows from the Gulf, they create policies that
promote outward flows of migration.
When examining emigration policy, India is a quintessential example for many reasons. Indians
make up the largest foreign population group in many GCC countries, and it is one of the largest
contributors to the global stock of migrants. Supporting a surplus labor population, India is more reliant
on remittance inflows than ever. Money flowing from workers in the Gulf makez up a large part of the
GDP in some Indian states such as Kerala and Andhra Pradesh (Vora 2013, 27). Because of this reliance,
India has crafted emigration policies that make the process of travelling abroad and remitting money
back to India much easier.
The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973 was created with the purpose of increasing the flow
of remittances from the Gulf to India. The classification of Nonresident Indian (NRI) was added to
categories of Indian residents with the purpose of including migrant workers in Indian society and
allowing them to continue reaping economic benefits without actually living in India (Vora 2013, 27).
NRIs can still contribute to India’s economy through remittances without receiving the political benefits
that an Indian citizen would receive.
In 1999, a new policy created another category for Indians residing outside of the country called
the Person of Indian Origin (PIO). This policy distributed cards to Indians living abroad with foreign
passports in an attempt to include them in India’s economy (Vora 2013, 27). Today, India is exploring
dual-citizenship models that would allow Indians who are living and working abroad to remain a part of
India’s society (Vora 2013, 25). This psychologically promotes feelings of inclusion and instills an
attachment to the home country, which in turn encourages participation, namely economic
participation, in society.
Another country that embraces and supports the emigration of their population is the Philippines.
Because of the lack of local employment and job opportunity, the Philippines recognizes the importance
of sending the surplus labor supply abroad. In 1974, the Labor Code of the Philippines was created as a
response to the lack of local employment opportunity and identified contract labor migration as a viable
solution (Modarres 2010, 7). The Labor Code increased the level of foreign currency and expanded
overseas opportunities. In 1982, the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration was created to
oversee the process of migration due to the sheer number of Filipinos seeking employment abroad
(Modarres 2010, 7).
These emigration policies certainly benefit countries who are significantly contributing to the
stock of international migrants economically. However, the desperation for remittances clouds the
priorities in crafting emigration legislation. Countries such as India and the Philippines continue to
promote emigration due to a significant labor surplus, which indirectly contributes to the abuse of
migrant workers abroad. Asian policies that aim to maintain economic integration of emigrants
legitimize the impermanence of migrants in destination countries and its ramifications that the kafala
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system produces. In addition, focusing on sending surplus populations abroad, local governments should
ensure that the rights of their citizens are upheld in destination countries.

5.5 SOCIAL AND SPATIAL SEGREGATION OF MIGRANTS FROM SOCIETY
So far I have discussed legal mechanisms that promote and perpetuate the ill treatment of
migrant workers living in GCC countries. The kafala system allows GCC countries to perpetuate the
inhumane treatment through ignorance and through locating the management of migrant laborers at
the level of the employer instead of the state. Immigrant-sending countries contribute to this
perpetuation through the promotion of mass emigration of the local population and supporting the
pursuit of seeking work abroad in order to create an employment equilibrium in their own countries.
Immigrant-sending countries also do little to promote dialogue with destination countries.15 Finally,
international legal instruments aim to standardize the rights that migrants receive on a global scale,
which would in effect tame the harsh treatment with which migrant laborers are met in the Gulf.
Though these efforts on the international level are genuine and provide a framework for change, they
hold no legal authority on the domestic level and are therefore often ignored by GCC countries.
Beyond the legal mechanisms that allow for and promote negative terms of migration to Gulf
countries, there are also inherent social and spatial structures present in Gulf societies that further
contribute to the marginalization of migrant laborers.
5.5.1

The Welfare State and the Benefits of Citizenship
Revenues resulting from the oil boom in the Gulf not only provided the financial resources to
implement expansive development plans, but have also allowed GCC governments to provide extensive
benefits to its citizens. The welfare state present in all GCC countries instills a mentality of racism,
classism, and superiority on the individual level. The root of this phenomenon is located on the level of
the state, as they are generating welfare benefits that are transferred to national citizens. However, the
effects that the welfare state has on the society are produced by the nationals themselves.
The government begins this process of discrimination by creating rigid boundaries and
classifications between citizens and non-citizens; nationals and non-nationals; Western expatriates and
Asian and African migrant laborers. By instituting these distinct categories that are based on race and
nationality, the government contributes to a racist and classist populace. The state situates citizens in a
superior position by providing housing, health care, a guaranteed income regardless of employment,
and education at all levels (Vora 2013, 10). The wage disparity based on nationality discussed above is
another mechanism used by governments and companies that transmits a racist mentality to the
mindset of the population.
The lack of rights and benefits for non-citizens in GCC countries creates a visible dichotomy in
Gulf society, which allows the citizenry to develop a superior mentality. This superior mentality can be
argued to be one of the causes of the social marginalization of migrant laborers. Migrants are thought of
as a populace on the periphery of society, education, wealth, and as an inferior group as a whole. I argue
that this attitude is a direct result of the rigid class system based on nationality that the welfare state
produces and perpetuates through the exploitation of the labor population.
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5.5.2 Wasta
Another mechanism contributing to the citizen-noncitizen dichotomy is a social structure called
wasta. Wasta is an Arabic word literally meaning connection, but can be best described in its colloquial
use as “social capital” (Gardner 2010, 154). Bourdieu describes social capital as “the sum of resources,
actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition,” (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992, 119). The phenomenon is best described by one of Andrew Gardner’s informants:
Wasta is a way to get there. When I say that I have a wasta in the Traffic Directorate, it means that
I’ve got somebody there who can help me cut through the red tape. They can take care of my
problem….‘with wasta you can do anything.’ ‘You better get wasta’ is a very common clause in
speech. If you have wasta, you can get it done in a day. It means you can get it done if you have a
way – an intermediary way, to get in, or someone inside the system. People even talk about Vitamin
W – that’s wasta.
It does not take long to recognize the importance of having wasta in the Gulf. If you don’t have
special connections when trying to get something done, especially with the government, the task
immediately turns into a significant obstacle when the same problem would be simply a speed bump for
a national.
Wasta is generally reserved for Gulf nationals, and at best, other Arab migrants. Wasta is obtained
through familial, tribal, and sectarian affiliation, meaning that foreigners inevitably lack this important
connection to mobilize their positions in society (Gardner 2010, 155). By using special connections to get
things done, national citizens profit both economically and socially. Because wasta is distinctly held by
nationals, they are inherently situated in an exceptionally high rung in society, contributing to the
superior mentality of nationals. The system of wasta, whose benefits are exclusive to citizens, makes
migrants conscious of their subordinate role in society, creating a more rigid class system based on
nationality and race, which results in a mentality of exclusion and separation for migrants and noncitizens.
5.5.3

Spatiality and Geography
The final method of constructing a psychological dynamic of separation between citizens and
non-citizens is through the physical exclusion of migrants from the city. The contemporary infrastructure
of Gulf cities is a result of the shift throughout the period of rapid influx of oil wealth. This shift relocated
the centers of Gulf cities from areas based on mercantilism and regional trade to areas based on tourism
and international trade. This shift left migrant laborers, particularly in the services sector, behind in less
developed niches of the city.
The geographical shift to new central areas of the city left migrant laborers on the physical
periphery of Gulf cities. As oil revenue provided the resources necessary for GCC states to modernize
and develop, Gulf cities simultaneously became more expensive places to live. This was not a problem
for nationals as they received increasing benefits, but the hike in the cost of living in central areas
pushed the lower rungs of society to the edges of the cities where the cost of living was affordable.
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Today, homogenous neighborhoods in Gulf cities serve as testimony to the socially
institutionalized dynamic of separation that both the state and its citizens have created. For example, in
the heart of Dubai, you will find neighborhoods of Emirati families and areas populated with Western
and Arab expatriates, which are off limits to laborers (Bristol-Rhys 2012, 79). In these areas of the city,
the only time you may see an Asian or African migrant will be if they are working in the malls, driving
taxis, or perfecting the landscapes that line the roads. If you travel to the edge of the Dubai, you will find
less developed neighborhoods which house less fortunate Arab and other migrant families. Once you
leave Dubai and enter into neighboring Emirates, here you will find many neighborhoods for migrant
workers and families. In Sharjah, the
Emirate neighboring Dubai to the north, I
saw many classified advertisements for
apartments searching for a tenant of a
specific nationality. For example, I saw
many signs reading “Apartment available
for Indian tenant.” As you will see in the
pictures below, the quality of life
diminishes the further away you go from
the heart of the city.

1q

Heart of the City
1. Jumeirah, travelsmadness.com
2. Dubai Marina, Time Out Dubai
3. Dubai Marina, Sara Hamza
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Periphery of the City: both pictures taken in Al
Rashidiya, an area at the Northern border of Dubai. Photos
taken by Sara Hamza

Both
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Neighboring Emirates: 1. Ras Al Khaimah, far northern Emirate of the UAE. In the
neighborhood of Aj Jazirah Al Hamra, an old coastal town with a number of
development projects underway; 2. Dirt Streets of Sharjah, the Emirate north of Dubai.
Photos taken by Sara Hamza

Free Trade Zones also serve as a mechanism that produces a segregated society based on
nationality. Free Trade Zones are exceptional areas where businesses and companies are not required to
meet the requirements that are compulsory throughout the rest of the city (Gardner 2010, 140). In
these areas, companies are not required to be owned by nationals, so by nature they attract foreigners.
Though these areas provide a haven where foreigners can feel a sense of belonging, the irony is that
these areas also generate feelings of exclusion through constructing physical areas exclusive to foreign
business investors.
Rapid development and modernization has resulted in a geographical hierarchy with the center
of the city at the top of the pyramid and the peripheral areas at the bottom. The “out of sight, out of
mind” mentality and the drastic hike in rents as a result of modernization and development has created
a spatial structure that places migrant laborers and labor camps on the very edge of the city.16
By placing labor camps on the periphery of the city, workers are both spatially and socially
insulated from society. The geographical separation is more obvious than the social segregation that
laborers experience. By placing labor camps on the outskirts of the city, it makes it nearly impossible for
laborers to interact with the rest of society. These areas are generally not served by public
transportation, and taxi fares from these areas to the city are extremely high (Gardner 2010, 66). Even if
the workers could afford the taxi fare, their long and arduous work days and little time off provides
another obstacle for workers to venture to the city. Because of the exhausting nature of their work,

16

Refer to the map of major labor camps in Dubai.
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laborers tend to find small tea shops in close proximity to their camps to spend their down time
(Gardner 2010, 66).
Social exclusion experienced by laborers is a bit harder to explain than physical exclusion and
relies on testimony from the laborers themselves. Through interviews conducted by Bristol-Rhys, she
found that workers understand and perceive the geographical separation as a method of
institutionalizing social exclusion. Though the physical marginalization of migrant laborers makes it
difficult for them to interact with the rest of society on a practical level, there are also unspoken barriers
of where workers can and cannot go (Bristol-Rhys 2012, 77). For example, the laborers are
systematically excluded from areas such as malls because they are generally too expensive “to even
purchase a cup of tea,” (Bristol-Rhys 2010, 77). However, laborers are also socially excluded as they
avoid these areas out of a fear of harassment by security guards. Mall security guards reported that they
were instructed to prevent laborers from entering because “they would just sit on benches and stare at
women,” (Bristol-Rhys 2012, 30). This generalization of the migrant labor population made by locals and
Westerners has produced a social monopoly over certain spatial areas of the city.
There are even socially-constructed barriers that exclude laborers from public areas. When
asked if the workers walked down to the Corniche to sit in the parks, one worker responded,
No, no, that is too far and it is also too difficult! The police watch you very closely down there, we
have been told, because they don’t want all of the men from the camps crowding the area. We
were told by our company that we should not go there at all (Bristol-Rhys 2012, 77).
When Bristol-Rhys asked why the workers felt uncomfortable going to these parks and other
public places, she found that the workers did not understand the concept of public. When she explained
that this meant that they are open to all of the people in the city, the worker responded, “No, Madam,
no, this is not the case because we are not people of the city, we live in the labor camp and are not
public,” (Bristol-Rhys 2012, 77).
The language barrier presents another obstacle to inclusion for migrant laborers. Companies
systematically hire people from different areas in Asia so that they have less in common both culturally
and linguistically (Gardner 2010, 63). India, for example, is home to hundreds of dialects which can even
vary within the same state. The differences in language both between the laborers and with the local
population present a significant barrier to societal immersion.
It is important to note that the migrant population in the Gulf is extremely diverse. It consists
mostly of South Asians and other Arab migrants, and smaller minority groups include Western
Europeans and Africans. Religion adds yet another layer of variation within the migrant population.
Religion differs across nationality lines, but also within the same nationality group. India provides
another great example as the Indian diaspora in the Gulf consists of both Muslims and Hindus. Vora
points out that Hindu and Muslim Indians in Dubai felt a sense of both solidarity and difference with one
another. Muslim Hindus feel a sense of belonging to the ummah, or the global community of Muslims,
which generates ideological similarities with the Islamic state of the UAE. Hindus and Christians often
perceived Muslims from South Asia as having an advantaged position in society due to religion, and that
they found more success in assimilating with Emiratis. However, Muslim Indians do not perceive their
religion as benefiting them in more ways than their Christian and Hindu counterparts (Vora 2013, 83).
Variation in language, religion, and nationality have all worked to create cleavages not only with locals,
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but also within the migrant population itself. This heterogeneous population prevents societal
immersion and also presents a barrier of unification of the migrant population. A disengaged migrant
population allows GCC states to exploit workers with ease.
The testimony from the workers interviewed by Bristol-Rhys proves that the exclusive nature of
society in the Gulf has produced a mentality of segregation and separation. In addition to the state of
impermanence that the kafala system institutes, systematic separation created by the state through
free trade zones, exclusive neighborhoods dedicated to certain nationalities, and extremely high rents in
the heart of the city have also resulted in socially constructed and spatial boundaries. Variation within
the migrant population has further contributed to cleavages both within the group and with the local
population. This has ultimately perpetuated the lack of efficacy in ameliorating the appalling effects of
the kafala system. Laborers are conscious of their role in Gulf societies, and discriminatory policies and
rules have shaped the superior mentality of nationals and the inferior mindsets of migrant laborers.

6 CASE STUDY: DUBAI
Dubai, one of the seven Emirates in the UAE, provides a perfect case study of a Gulf city that
developed at light speed. Located on the shores of the Persian Gulf, the city of Dubai has become
infamous for its iconic, ultramodern architecture, manmade islands, and its futuristic atmosphere. The
discovery of oil is often seen as the distinct catalyst that carried Dubai from its mercantilist history to its
new role as a global player in the realm of tourism, finance, and real estate. However, the lived
experiences during the periods of rapid transformation are often left out of modernization narratives of
Gulf societies. Though discovery of oil certainly played an important role in the rapid transformation of
Dubai from a regional port city to a globally important trading center, the role that various sub-groups
and migrant populations played in this transformation are integral to Dubai’s iconic presence in
contemporary landscapes.
Dubai is known for its luxury and extravagance, but you do not have to travel far to find contrasting
lifestyles. When one thinks of expatriates, there is common image of Westerners seeking tax-free work.
The reality is that the majority of expatriates are Arab immigrants and, in greater numbers, migrant
workers from Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. They provide the backbone of society and
labor to provide the Gulf with its iconic infrastructure.
Dubai serves as a quintessential example of a developed Gulf city, while at the same time
constructs itself as a distinctly different place than anywhere else in the world. Dubai is a city of dualities
and divides, and is home to many political, social, and spatial boundaries and dichotomies. All of the
legal and social mechanisms discussed in the previous sections have played out in a way that has
created rigid boundaries between different social classes, races, nationalities, and religions. These
dichotomies between various populations in Dubai are perpetuated by the government through rigid
distinctions between citizens and residents, nationals and non-nationals, locals and expatriates, as well
as temporary workers largely from South Asia and Western migrants. These distinctions used in political
discourse trickle down to every level of society. Because the government makes distinctions between
different nationalities and legal statuses, the citizenry follows suit and uses these same distinctions in
commercial enterprise, in the media, and in daily life. This dynamic of exclusivity and separation in Dubai
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then trickles down to the migrants themselves, perpetuating feelings of inferiority, unimportance, and
exclusion.
Though the contemporary condition of groups insulated by nationalities and social status is a result
of deep-seated and long standing histories of exclusion, Indians and other Asian populations have
longstanding ties to the Gulf. Though the kafala system excludes these populations through denying
them any form of legal belonging, they have played in integral role in the development of the city
throughout the 20th century. Because they cannot enjoy any form of legal belonging to the Emirati
nation, but simultaneously serve an integral role in the operation of governance, to national identity and
citizenship, and to the functioning of Dubai’s global market, Neha Vora describes the Indian diaspora in
Dubai as a group of “impossible citizens” (Vora 2013, 3).
Today, nationals have become a minority group in the Emirates. According to government statistics
from 2011, foreigners make up more than 88.5% of the population in the Emirates, and more than 90%
in the Emirate of Dubai (Human Rights Watch 2014). This group is largely made up of low paid migrant
workers from South Asia, who provide the foundation of the country’s workforce. 95% of the workforce
in the United Arab Emirates consists of foreigners (Human Rights Watch 2006, 7). It is estimated that by
2020, Emirati citizens will account for less than four percent of the total workforce in the UAE
(Janardhan 2011, 98).

6.1 HISTORY
Though Dubai’s period of development and modernization was extremely rapid, the lived
experiences during this period are crucial to contextualizing the narrative of Dubai’s history. The
discovery of oil and the rapid influx of revenues to Gulf monarchies and nationals have provided the
financial resources necessary for modernization. However, the hands that physically built the iconic
infrastructure of Dubai and provided the necessary manpower are often excluded from the story of
modernization. Throughout the 20th century, the migrant populations that played an integral role in the
Dubai’s development have been marginalized and excluded from the return on the city’s profitable
modernization efforts.
Prior to the discovery of oil, Dubai was known as the main trading center of the region (Ali 2010,
15). Traders and merchants from neighboring countries along the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean
travelled to Dubai to participate in the trade of pearls and gold. In the early 20th century, the pearl and
gold industry facilitated trade with India, Pakistan, and Persia, which formed the foundation of the
relationships and the initial exchange of populations between these countries (Ali 2010, 15). During this
time period, people were concentrated along the Dubai Creek due to its geographic importance for
trade. This caused commercial and residential rents to increase, which essentially produced an area
exclusive to upper-class individuals and families while simultaneously marginalizing those who were
financially unable to survive in these areas (Ali 2010, 15). This pattern of the wealthy occupying and
monopolizing the current city-center and simultaneously marginalizing the less fortunate segments of
the population is a recurring theme throughout Dubai’s history.
After roughly 20 years of economic depression due to the collapse of the pearl trade industry,
Dubai finally saw an upsurge of commercial activity and trade with Indian and Pakistan in the 1950s (Ali
2010, 15). Because of Dubai’s reliance on trade for economic prosperity, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed al
Maktoum refocused efforts on developing the city with the aim of boosting the economy (Ali 2010, 17).
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Sheikh Rashid plan’s included dredging the creek, which had become extremely silted in many crucial
areas, the building of an international airport, and the construction of more ports (Ali 2010, 17-18).
These projects required more manpower than Dubai could supply, which initiated the first influx of
migrants to Dubai for the specific purpose of providing labor. Migrants during this period came from
India, Pakistan, and Iran. In 1968, Dubai hosted a population of 65,000; twenty to twenty-five thousand
of which were Iranian, 12,000 Pakistani, and around 8-10,000 were Indian (Ali 2010, 18). During this
time, areas such as Karama and Satwa were intentionally built as areas of low income housing to house
migrant workers. These areas are still known today as poor parts of the city. This was one of the initial
acts of insulating migrant workers from the rest of society. In previous time periods, traders from South
Asian countries were of a wealthier class than those who were now migrating to supply labor. Because
of their economic class in previous eras, Indian and other Asian merchants lived among Gulf nationals
and were easily assimilated and included in Gulf society.
Around the time of initial development efforts, oil was discovered in Dubai in 1966 (Ali 2010, 26).
Oil revenues were not the sole cause of development in Dubai as development projects were already
underway; however, the rapid influx of profit provided the necessary resources for the Dubai
government to continue these projects at a breakneck speed. Oil revenue not only benefitted the state,
but it allowed the Dubai citizenry to experience new, luxurious existences, which starkly contrasted with
previous Bedouin lifestyles (Ali 2010, 27).
6.1.1

Welfare Programs
By the early 1980s, the government experienced enough oil revenue to begin providing welfare
programs to its citizens. These programs have developed over time and continue to provide significant
benefits to the Dubai citizenry. Some of the benefits include schooling up to the PhD level anywhere in
the world, free plots of land, interest-free loans to build a house, and payments to nationals to marry
other nationals. The government provides well-paying jobs to its nationals, which often require little
work, subsidized housing for low income nationals, and generous charities to nationals who cannot work
(Ali 2010, 176-77).
Welfare programs have contributed to the rigid class boundaries in Dubai. Through providing
generous benefits to citizens and denying non-nationals the same benefits, migrants are placed outside
of the legal framework of the country. There are no processes of naturalization for migrants in place in
the UAE, which not only excludes migrants from legal consideration, but the mentality of exclusion
initiated on the level of the state transcends to the mindset of Dubai’s population.
The welfare state that has developed in the United Arab Emirates has created a consumer
culture among Emirati nationals, which has produced and perpetuated a status quo where locals act as
consumers and migrants as producers (Ali 2010, 28). The welfare state has fostered a superior mindset
among nationals, which ultimately causes locals to rely on migrants to supply the manpower for the
menial jobs which they view as inferior. Because these jobs, such as those in the construction sector, are
necessary to support the consumer culture in Dubai, Emiratis remain reliant on an imported labor supply.
The consumer culture in Dubai can be seen in the centrality and importance of malls, night clubs,
fine dining, and luxury hotels (Ali 2010, 9). Malls serve many functions in Gulf society. They serve as
meeting grounds, as an escape from the year-round heat, as ostentatious displays of wealth and luxury,
a tourist destination, and as a central hub of each Gulf city. In each Gulf city which I visited, the most
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recommended tourist attractions were the grand mosque, the souq (market), and the mall. These
recommendations highlight some of the most important aspects of society in Gulf cities: religion and
shopping.
The consumer culture that has been made possible to Emirati citizens through the generous
benefits of the welfare state have also simultaneously excluded migrants from the luxurious lifestyles
that the consumer culture supports. In particular, migrant workers are systematically excluded from this
lifestyle, as many Western expatriates already have the resources necessary to participate in similar
patterns of consumption. Many of the mechanisms discussed above (such as low wages for migrant
workers, exclusion from the welfare state, and geographical separation from the city) are employed in
Dubai to socially exclude migrant workers from society.
6.1.2

Free Trade Zones
By the 1980s and 1990s, trade interests in Dubai had expanded. Previous development efforts
initiated by Sheikh Rashid bin Al Maktoum paved the way for Dubai’s emergence onto the global playing
field. A component of these development efforts spurred by Dubai’s neoliberal policies aiming to attract
foreign investment was the creation of free trade zones scattered throughout the city. Jebel Ali, Dubai’s
first industrial free zone, opened in 1980 and was the first geographical area in the city that operated
outside of the legal structure upheld throughout the rest of Dubai. Because the free zone was not
required to abide by the rules and regulations set forth by the kafala system or the country’s other laws
which are rooted in Islamic principles, Jebel Ali offered 100 percent business ownership, no import
duties, minimal capital requirement, and relaxed work visa regulations (Vora 2013, 46).
The first free trade zone located in Dubai’s Jebel Ali port was extremely successful in attracting
foreign investors and providing them with a way to actively contribute to the economy. This success
initiated the development of a series of other free trade zones which all operated outside the
parameters of the existing legal structure, each with a unique theme ranging from the service industry,
to investment, to media cities (Vora 2013, 46). The relaxed regulations within these zones attract multinational companies and Western expatriates interested in business enterprise in Dubai’s booming
economy. Dubai’s recent ascension as an important global player provided new frontiers for multinational companies interested in expanding their global influence.
While free trade zones in Dubai created a new way for foreigners to participate in the
stimulation of the economy, they have simultaneously contributed to the hierarchy of the city where the
employees of the service sector consistently occupy the lowest rungs of society. Those who supply the
manpower for the service sector of the economy, which are primarily South Asian minority groups, are
marginalized from society through exclusion from areas of the city which allow foreigners to profit from
the booming economy. While free trade zones offer Western expatriates forms of economic inclusion,
those in the service sector, who do not have the resources necessary to participate in business
enterprise, are left on the periphery of the city geographically, economically, and socially.
This structure allows the government to administer different laws for different segments of the
population. Nationals benefit from welfare assistance and profit from the policies of the kafala system.
Western expatriates benefit from economic opportunities in free-trade zones and are free to operate
outside of the parameters of the legal structure. On the other hand, migrant groups fall outside the
parameters of any benefits or protection from the government which provide forms of inclusion and
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belonging to the city, and are also kept in a perpetual state of inferiority by the rules of the kafala
system. Dubai’s neoliberal policies ensure economic success for nationals and Western expatriates while
making it impossible for migrant laborers to profit from their work.

6.1.3

Tourism
Tradition and modernity in Dubai interact and blend with one another in a unique way that is
hard to find elsewhere in the world. The city is full of paradoxes, dualities, and juxtapositions that speak
to the simultaneous presence of innovation and tradition, globalization and localization, and modernity
and antiquity. The tourism sector of Dubai’s economy is an interesting illustration of how entities that
are seemingly dichotomous interact and blend with one another.
The innovation of the free trade zones beginning in the 1980s initiated an influx of Westerners
and Western-based companies to Dubai. Through the success of free trade zones, Dubai saw that it
could benefit from the diversification of its economy and through opening up access to those beyond
the region. Another mechanism of attracting foreigners to Dubai is through the development of the
tourism industry. Tourism in Dubai has evolved as an artificially constructed industry through
development efforts as Dubai has no natural attraction for tourists. There are no significant historical
landmarks or environmental landscapes unique to the country. The lack of natural attraction combined
with the unbearable heat does not place Dubai on the top of the list of travel destinations. In order to
attract travelers, Dubai has had to construct and create attractions. The list of these attractions grew
rapidly throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and today all the marvels of Dubai combined together have
worked to craft a uniquely iconic city that tops lists of places to visit.
Before the innovation of the free trade zone and the emergence of the tourism industry in Dubai,
Westerners had little reason to travel to the United Arab Emirates. As Dubai erected unique and
interesting attractions and as the tourism sector developed, more and more Westerners began
travelling to Dubai. By the late 1990s, 200,000 British tourists were travelling to Dubai annually. During
the early 2000s, wealthy South Asians and other Gulf Arabs were travelling in significant numbers to the
country (Ali 2010, 25-6).
However, the development of the tourism industry did not come easily. Because there is nothing
organic about the tourist attractions in Dubai, the development required significant financial investment,
time, and labor. Dubai had the homegrown resources to supply the financial investment from oil wealth;
however, Dubai could not supply its own labor for these expansive development projects (Ali 2010, 6).
Dubai transformed its landscape from sprawling stretches of desert to a cosmopolitan city within a
matter of decades. During the 1960s, Dubai was still a stretch of desert and was still home to Bedouins
living in palm frond huts. The United Arab Emirates gained independence in 1971, and by this time much
of Dubai’s population was sedentary living in housing blocks. By the 1980s, the United Arab Emirates
had developed and profited enough from oil to begin providing welfare benefits to its citizens (Ali 2010,
27). Within two decades, the citizenry of the country saw a dramatic shift from a truly traditional way of
life to new lifestyles which supported and consumerism. As of 2010, the tourism industry accounted for
30% of Dubai’s GDP, and Dubai received roughly 7 million tourists each year (Ali 2010, 43).
During this period of development, projects to support the tourism industry took priority.
Beginning with Sheikh Rashid’s dredging of the Dubai Creek, the focus had become creating effective
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and reliable ways for foreigners to easily travel through the city (Ali 2010, 6). After the dredging of the
Creek, two massive ports were constructed, and the development of an immense international airport
was initiated (Ali 2010, 6). Today, the Dubai International Airport is central to the country’s importance
in the global sphere. The airport serves as a link between Europe and South Asia to the Middle East and
Africa (Ali 2010, 6). The International Airport was the seventh most travelled airport in the world in 2013,
and had the highest growth rate among the top ten most travelled airports (15.2% growth from 2012).
Further, the Dubai International Airport ranked fifth in the world based on revenue freight plus mail
(The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey 2013, 58).
The development of Dubai’s International Airport goes hand-in-hand with the business
enterprise of the Emirates Airline. Emirates Airline was launched in 1985, and has since been notorious
for its luxurious flights (Ali 2010, 21). Dubai’s flagship airline allows the country to further profit from
flights to and from its international airport, and serves as an example of the luxury that Dubai has to
offer throughout the world. The airline’s expansion to new cities has grown steadily since its inception,
and this growth mirrors the increasing role of Dubai as both a tourist destination and a central hub
linking Europe with the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.
The international airport and Emirates Airline provided the necessary foundations on which the
tourism industry could grow. In the words of Sayed Ali, the tourism industry is built upon the two pillars
of shopping and hedonism (Ali 2010, 43). The development of the city as a global shopping center was
also central in crafting Dubai as a travel destination (Ali 2010, 43). It does not take much time in the
country to recognize the importance and centrality of shopping in society. Malls serve a social
importance in Gulf society, extending beyond their basic function of providing a place to consume goods.
Dubai has worked to cultivate the centrality of shopping in society, and shopping and consumerism have
therefore become significant aspects of culture in Dubai and across the Gulf.
Today, Dubai is home to over forty malls, many of which have a unique theme that differentiates
them from any other shopping center (Ali 2010, 44). The Dubai Mall is the biggest in the world, the Mall
of the Emirates has an indoor ski slope, and Mercato Mall is designed to look like a Venetian city. In
1996, the Dubai government established the Dubai Shopping Festival (DSF), an extravagant shopping
and entertainment event which features coordinated shopping sales across the city, discounts, and no
sales tax. The Festival not only encourages consumerism among the local population, but also attracts
tourists from around the world. The Festival drew 1.6 million visitors in its first year, and has continued
to attract tourists since (Ali 2010, 23). The Festival is a brilliant marketing strategy that promotes
consumption among locals and attracts tourists, which ultimately achieves the goal of stimulating the
economy.
Another man-made attraction in Dubai has been the plethora of luxurious nightclubs, hotels and
fine dining restaurants. Nearly all of the hotels constructed in the recent past are four and five star
hotels, setting a precedent for the luxury which Dubai has to offer. Topping the list of these luxury hotels
is the Burj al-Arab, the sail-shaped hotel built on an artificial island in 1999 (Ali 2010, 52). The hotel is
often called the “only seven star hotel” in the world, though the technicalities of the star rating are
disputed. Rooms begin at $1,000 a night, which reserves the space for the extremely wealthy and
famous passing through Dubai. The hotel serves as one of the most iconic structures in the Dubai skyline,
and though the quality of the hotel exceeds the means of the average person, the sail-shaped silhouette
in the sky means something to everyone in Dubai. The hotel is rumored to lose money due staggering
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prices, however the value of the hotel is in its ability to brand Dubai as a luxurious travel destination (Ali
2010, 52).
The unparalleled nightlife serves the same purpose as the luxurious hotels in Dubai. As one club
owner put it, “We’re like the Miami of the Middle East. It’s all about showing up in the best car, getting
the best table and sharing the biggest bottle of Cristal with the best-looking girls,” (Ali 2010, 45-6). The
unique clubbing experience in Dubai is supported by the wide range of themes and locations. The
nightlife in Dubai will never leave you bored; from the circus themed nightclub, to the dance club on the
beach, to the exclusive pyramid-shaped club atop a high-rise tower, the nightlife experience in Dubai is
truly unique.
Though not everyone in Dubai consumes the services of the ultra-luxurious hotels and
restaurants, they still play a significant role and create the ability to say “Dubai has the only seven star
hotel in the world,” or “Dubai has the tallest building in the world.” The overarching strategy used to
market Dubai as a top travel destination has been to create the biggest, the best, and to set records
signaling luxury throughout the world. Through creating a luxurious haven contrasting with the rest of
the Middle East, Dubai has achieved its goal of attracting Western tourists and professional expatriates.
Sayed Ali argues that without the nightlife scene geared toward a Western audience, it would have been
unlikely that so many Westerners would have travelled to Dubai in the first place because of the strict
laws based on Islamic principles throughout the country (Ali 2010, 45). 17
6.1.4

Development, Construction Boom and its Effects on Migrant Labor
The last section gives an idea of just how rapid, systematic, and expansive Dubai’s development
efforts were. Within a matter of decades, Dubai emerged from a sprawling stretch of desert to a
cosmopolitan city featuring some of the most distinct structures in the world. Today, Dubai is home to
the tallest building in the world, the biggest mall, two sets of man-made islands shaped like palm trees,
an artificial archipelago resembling the world map, one of the most travelled airports, and the only
seven star hotel in the world.18
This same development trajectory has taken centuries for other countries to achieve. It is clear
that oil wealth has assisted in this speed of light expansion, however Dubai does not have the
homegrown resources to support this growth without the help from its neighboring countries. Though
the government provided the financial resources necessary for these development projects, Dubai has
historically hosted a small population size, which has produced a labor deficit. Because neighboring
countries such as India and the Philippines have the opposite problem of hosting a labor surplus, the
countries create a compatible conduit of labor migration.
Within two years after the discovery of oil, Emirati national citizens in Dubai were already
slightly in the minority (Ali 2010, 26). Indians have made up the largest national group in Dubai since the
beginning of the development era. Though Indians were present in Dubai as merchants before the 20th
century, Dubai’s demand for labor significantly increased the density of the India-UAE migration conduit.
By the 1970s, Indians accounted for the third largest group in the UAE, with a population of 102,000 of a
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It is important to note that Islam bans the consumption of alcohol. Though it is not rare to find a Muslim
enjoying the nightlife scene, the comprehensive effort to create an established club scene in Dubai was geared
exclusively toward Westerners.
18
Again, this accolade is rooted in hearsay.

33

total 656,000 population (Ali 2010, 28). Today, Indians account for almost 40 percent of the population
of Dubai (Ali 2010, 29).
Development efforts and the demand for import labor created a massive construction boom in
Dubai. During the early 2000s, the construction sector was a leading contributor to the economic growth
of the country (Human Rights Watch 2006). Between 2000 and 2004, the construction sector’s
contribution to GDP grew by 23%, with an annual growth rate of 5%.
Today, construction workers account for one-fourth of the population of Dubai and experience
many of the injustices discussed in the “Treatment of Workers” section (Ali 2010, 83). They are paid
extremely low wages that are often withheld, their passports are confiscated, they arrive to the country
with preexisting debt to recruitment agencies, they are forced to live in unsanitary labor camps located
on the periphery of the city, labor unions are prohibited, and the workers suffer financial and health
ramifications due to the cyclical nature of labor migration that the kafala system instills. In the next
section, I will discuss how these injustices play out on the ground in Dubai with the example of the
construction of the Burj Khalifa.

6.2 SPOTLIGHT ON THE BURJ KHALIFA
Emaar, one of the largest real estate companies in Dubai, announced in 2003 its plan to construct
the tallest building in the world. By 2004, construction of what was then called the Burj Dubai began in
the heart of the city at a staggering pace. However, the needle-shaped building dominating Dubai’s
skyline was not finished until 2010 due to the economic crisis that struck in 2009 (Malik 2011).
The plan to build the tallest building in the world was not an absurd proposal. In fact, the project
fit in quite neatly with other development plans in Dubai. At the same time, extravagant plans to build
Palm Jumeirah, Dubai World, and Dubailand were already underway.19 The proposal and execution of
these projects all contributed to the construction boom in the early 2000s, and ultimately placed a great
demand for an import labor supply.
The Burj Khalifa serves a greater purpose than standing as the tallest building in the world. The
building is symbolic of Dubai’s emerging prowess in the world on many different levels. The official
website of the Burj Khalifa states:
[The Burj Khalifa is] more than just the world’s tallest building, Burj Khalifa is an unprecedented
example of international cooperation, symbolic beacon of progress, and an emblem of the new,
dynamic and prosperous Middle East. It is tangible proof of Dubai’s growing role in a changing
world. In fewer than 30 years, this city has transformed itself from a regional centre to a global
one. This success was not based on oil reserves, but on reserves of human talent, ingenuity and
initiative. Burj Khalifa embodies that vision (Emaar Properties PJSC)
However, behind the façade of the symbolic presence of the Burj Khalifa exists the lives of an
overlooked sub-population. The Burj Khalifa aims to represent luxury, cosmopolitanism, and modernism.
However, the story of its construction represents capitalism at its finest, exploitation of an import labor
population, and the deep-seated racist mindset that is ever-present in Dubai. Luxury in Dubai has come
at the expense of the lives of migrant laborers who go to great extents to send money home to their
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Some of these projects would never come to fruition due to the economic crisis in 2009.
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families. In the process, migrant laborers fall in the trap of the kafala system, which keeps them in a
perpetual state of debt, marginalization, and inferiority in Emirati society.
6.2.1

Construction
The construction of the Burj Khalifa was truly an international collaboration, with 60 contracting
and consulting companies and over 12,000 workers representing more than 100 nationalities
(Construction Week 2010). At the time of its completion, 22 million man hours were expended on the
construction of the building (Construction Week 2010). Arabtec, the largest construction company in the
UAE, was one of the three main contractors of the project. Though there is not much information about
the treatment of laborers exclusively at the site of the Burj Khalifa, we can infer the treatment and living
conditions of these workers from BBC’s Panorama report in April 2009. As discussed in an earlier section,
the program exposed the failure of Arabtec to provide sanitary living conditions for its 60,000 workers.
Heaps of feces were piled in the toilets, and raw sewage had leaked all over the camp (Ali 2010, 92).
Not only were workers forced to live in unsanitary conditions, but they were also forced worked
an extraordinary amount for unlivable wages. The average worker at the Burj Khalifa site toiled 12 hours
each day, 6 days a week, for $4 per day (Migrant Rights 2010). While UAE Labor Law requires all workers
to take a break between 12:30 and 3:00 PM due to the merciless heat, many testimonials claim that
workers were not always given this break. At the end of each day, workers were loaded onto busses that
would transport them back to the labor camps.
6.2.2

Protests and Riots
Low wages, the perilous working environment, and living conditions for construction workers at
the Burj Khalifa created high tensions between the workers and their companies. Throughout the
duration of the construction, worker grievances culminated in a number of riots and strikes in an
attempt to voice discontent with the inhuman condition in which they were living. Discontent at this
major construction site echoed throughout the city and encouraged a number of protests at other sites.
Between May and December of 2005, the UAE government reports that at least eight major
strikes took place in Dubai (Human Rights Watch 2006, 24). In September 2005, around 1,000 workers
from Al Hamed Development and Construction banded together and blocked Dubai’s main highway in
protest of their unpaid wages.20 If you have ever been on Sheikh Zayed Road, the longest highway in the
Emirates stretching from Abu Dhabi to the Northern emirate of Ras Al Khaimah, you know that there
doesn’t need to be a human blockage for chaos to ensue. During peak hours, the highway becomes so
congested naturally that a twenty minute commute can turn into a journey lasting over an hour.
Needless to say, a human blockage of the road served as an effective cry for help, and the faces that
usually remained on the sidelines were now on center stage.
As a response to this protest, Minister of Labor Ali bin Abdullah Al Kaabi stepped in and
demanded that Al Hamed pay the delayed wages “within the next 24 hours” (Human Rights Watch 2006,
31). The local media depicted this action as Dubai’s commitment to upholding the country’s labor laws.
However, testimony of how the aftermath of the strike played out tells a different story. As discussed
above, a Pakistani worker told Human Rights Watch that only two of the four months of delayed wages
were paid, and another month of wages were withheld since the protest. The government didn’t fine
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Al Hamed Development and Construction is one of the leading local construction companies in the UAE.
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the company even though withholding wages is illegal in the UAE, and the government didn’t follow up
after demanding that the wages be paid. Further, the leaders of the strike were deported to their home
countries (Human Rights Watch 2006, 31).
Though the UAE prohibits unions and strikes, the construction workers must determine the cost
of remaining silent. The Al Hamed Pakistani worker told Human Rights Watch: “Among ourselves, we
argued that either we will get deported because of our strike action or it will result in recovering our
unpaid wages. We didn’t have a choice; we were willing to risk it,” (Human Rights Watch 2006, 31).
By March 2006, conditions for workers at the Burj Khalifa in a large scale protest at the
construction site. In accordance with previous protests, the discontent voiced in 2006 cited inhumane
working and living conditions and low wages (Human Rights Watch 2006, 37).
On March 21, 2006, workers had been waiting for their bus to transport them back to their
camps as they did every day. After the busses were delayed for several hours, the aggravation quickly
escalated to a violent protest. Nearly 2,500 workers rioted that day, and after hours of waiting to be
taken home some of the protesters began assaulting security officers, breaking into offices, smashing
computers, and destroying cars and construction machines (Whitaker 2006). An Indian worker present
at the protests told Human Rights Watch:
On March 21, it was mostly the new workers who rioted. They were stressed because
after we finish our shift, it takes over an hour to punch out. On that day, the busses were
delayed for hours. The workers started to complain. The company’s security forces
started to harass them and abuse them verbally. This provoked the rioting. The new
workers were demanding pay raises (Human Rights Watch 2006, 37).
In May 2006, workers employed by Besix, one of the three main contractors for the construction
of the Burj Khalifa, staged a strike calling for better wages. On May 16th, Over 8,000 workers refused to
work until their demands were met. In response to the protest, the government deported 50 Besix
workers who refused to return to work (Human Rights Watch 2006, 38).
Another unconventional but certainly bold form of protest in Dubai has been suicide. In 2011, an
Indian cleaner jumped from the heights of the Burj Khalifa 10 months after its opening after being
denied his promised holiday time (Malik 2011). The Indian worker could have taken his life in a number
of ways, but choosing to jump from Dubai’s iconic Burj Khalifa was a deliberate act of protest. Suicide in
this case serves the dual purpose of escaping the harsh reality for the Indian worker and bringing the
issue to the forefront of national and international dialogue. The story gained a significant amount of
media coverage, attention that likely would not have followed if the worker had committed suicide
elsewhere.
In the aftermath of the Burj Khalifa suicide, the Indian consulate in Dubai revealed that at least
two Indians in Dubai commit suicide each week (Malik 2011). In 2005 alone, 84 Indian nationals
committed suicide (Human Rights Watch 2006, 44). Human Rights Watch detailed the suicides of two
other Indians in Dubai, both with similar discontents. Julfikar Korani hung himself in the bathroom of
Dubai’s largest labor camp, Sonapar (Human Rights Watch 2006, 46). Julfikar’s monthly wage was $190
per month, and records showed that he was only paid for one of the six months that he had been
working. Julfikar had taken a loan of $2,000 to obtain a work visa, and was required to pay back $140
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per month (Human Rights Watch 2006, 46). Because Julfikar could not possibly pay this amount back
and still have enough money to live, he was falling behind on his payments, placing a significant financial
burden on his shoulders.
Dr. Shiv Prakash, a psychiatrist at the New Medical Center and Hospital in Dubai, commented on
the recurrence of suicide among migrant laborers in Construction Week:
When these workers reach here they realize what they have gotten themselves into and
see that they’ve lost everything, they react to it. They feel trapped as they know that
they can’t go back either. There’s no escape. They know they are in a bonded type of
situation and are reacting to what they think is the biggest mistake in their life, an
irreparable loss. It is the reaction to this loss which can lead to suicidal contemplation
(Human Rights Watch 2006, 47).

7 CONCLUSION
The kafala system is the obvious culprit of the complications involving labor migration in the GCC. It
provides the foundations on which states can build to exploit this sub-population, which further
produces other social mechanisms of exclusion and marginalization in society. While development and
modernization are still largely characterized by the exploitation of the migrant population, there have
been some reform movements since the turn of the 21st century. Because of the authoritative nature of
GCC governments, many of these have been social movements which are often excluded from the
political sphere. However, some GCC governments have made headway on ameliorating the negative
consequences of the kafala system.
Bahrain has been the only country to do away with the kafala system entirely. In August 2009, the
government decided that it wanted to take control of the regulation of the migrant labor population and
eliminate the middleman required by the sponsorship system. In a bold public statement, the Minister
of Labor compared the system to slavery (Janardhan 2011, 117). Though there are still remnants of the
kafala system in Bahrain, this is a positive first step and sets a good example for other GCC countries.
GCC countries have also faced some pressure from immigrant-sending countries. In 2008, several
Asian countries pressed the GCC to establish a minimum wage for its migrant labor population. However,
the GCC ignored this proposal (Janardhan 2011, 120).
Other movements calling for migration reform in the Gulf have existed in the sphere of social media.
Though they have few followers, several groups on Facebook have voiced concern about the migrant
labor situation in the Gulf and call for reform. Some of these groups are titled “Minimum Wage for
Dubai Construction Workers,” “GCC Human Rights,” and “Dubai’s Dirty Little Secret.”
Others include humanitarian groups and information clearinghouses. Helping Hands UAE is a
secular humanitarian group that aims to help the most underprivileged and exploited segments of
society. This group was founded by British expatriates, and works to supply food and clothing to laborers
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in camps and to housemaids (Helping Hands UAE). The Migrant Rights website seeks to provide a
reliable source of information about migrant workers in the Middle East. Through organizing campaigns
and publishing op-eds, the group hopes to advance the rights of migrant workers and to break the
silence surrounding the abuses of workers’ basic human rights (Migrant Rights).
Finally, the governments themselves have responded to the abundance of complaints regarding the
kafala system. In 2005, the Dubai Police established a Human Rights Department in an attempt to
address labor disputes between employees and their employers. Once the worker files a complaint, the
Department contacts the employer and mediates a joint meeting between the two parties. If no
agreement is reached, the case is then referred to the Ministry of Labor. The Human Rights Department
has been successful in collecting unpaid wages, however it has no binding legal powers to enforce its
decisions. There is no guarantee that once the case is resolved by the Department that the employer will
actually respond accordingly or pay full wages in the future (Human Rights Watch 2006, 54). The
phenomenon is seen in the case of Al Hamed discussed above.
Later in 2005, the Government of Dubai also established a Permanent Committee on Labor Affairs
(PCLA) to mediate labor disputes. Between March and December of 2005, 19,249 workers filed
complaints, and the PCLA resolved nearly 20,000 cases of unpaid wages. Committee inspectors also
visited 36 labor camps during this period, 75% of which were found to be well below government
standards (Human Rights Watch 2006, 54).
While these new departments are steps in the right direction, they are what David Mendicoff calls
“ad hoc accommodations,” (Mendicoff 2012, 194). Governments prefer informal regulation that treats
the problems after they already happen over regulatory legal policies that would prevent the problems
in the first place (Mendicoff 2012, 194). Through avoiding the establishment of regulatory policies, the
governments allow the kafala system to continue regulating the migrant labor population.
Though they have not taken any real steps in reforming the regulation of migration, governments
appear willing to talk. In September 2005, 11 source countries met with nine destination countries at
the Abu Dhabi Dialogue to discuss a collaborative approach of managing short-term labor. Source
countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, The Philippines, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. The destination countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue Group (ADDG) was
officially established in 2008, and since conducts regular meetings to foster dialogue between sending
and receiving countries. The focus of the Dialogue is to promote the welfare of the workers themselves
through fostering inter-governmental cooperation (Martin 2012, 229).
GCC governments have also responded to the growing migrant population on other fronts. Because
all six GCC countries are characterized by a demographic imbalance where local populations constitute a
small minority of the total population, there has been an effort to systematically “Arabize” their cultures.
Hosting large and diverse foreign populations, these countries have experienced the dilution of local
culture. States fear that the enormous migrant presence poses a threat to local culture and may foster
erasures of the past. Governments have established efforts to develop aspects of local culture that are
purified from any foreign influence in an attempt to distinguish themselves from the migrant population.
Because the Gulf States are relatively young, there is an absence of a strong sense of national identity.
The governments of the GCC have worked to establish heritage projects and other displays of culture in
an attempt to create ties between locals and their heritage (Vora 2013, 12-13).
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The Arabian Gulf has come a long way in the matter of a few decades. Sprawling stretches of desert
have been replaced with cosmopolitan cities, and the Gulf has transformed from a regional trading
center to a globally important region. These transformations have come with a price, however, and we
must take into account all aspects of the modernization story. GCC countries continue to exploit the
migrant labor population through their use of the kafala system, which allows for exploitation and grave
human rights abuses. This sub-population often remains on the periphery of Gulf societies in many ways.
Not only are they physically marginalized from Gulf cities, but they are also socially and politically
excluded from society. GCC governments should work to reform the system of regulation of the migrant
population, to provide forms of inclusion, and to ameliorate the appalling conditions under which
migrant laborers are living. Further, immigrant-sending countries should play a more dominant role in
ensuring the rights of their citizens in Gulf countries.
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